

Message Text

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FOR CARTER FROM PA

E.O. 11652: N/A

TAGS: SOPN, OVIP (VANCE)

SUBJECT: PRESS MATERIAL

1. HERewith FULL TEXT JOHN W. FINNEY PAGE THREE BYLINER
NEW YORK TIMES TUESDAY MAY 10 HEADED "WARNKE NOW SAYS
U.S. ALSO WANTS ON-SITE INSPECTION IN AN ARMS PACT."

2. PAUL C. WARNKE, DIRECTOR OF THE ARMS CONTROL AND
DISARMAMENT AGENCY, DISCLOSED TODAY THAT THE UNITED
STATES' COMPREHENSIVE STRATEGIC ARMS PROPOSAL WOULD
REQUIRE SOME ON-SITE INSPECTION, A VERIFICATION MEASURE
THAT HAS GENERALLY BEEN RESISTED BY THE SOVIET UNION.

3. THE ARMS NEGOTIATOR ALSO SAID AT A MEETING WITH
REPORTERS THAT THE UNITED STATES PLANNED TO RAISE WITH
THE SOVIET UNION THE NEED FOR PREVENTING THE CONCEAL-
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MENT OF WEAPONS SO THAT THEY CAN BE DETECTED BY RECON-
NAISSANCE SATELLITES. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, HE
ACKNOWLEDGED THAT ONE SPECIFIC ISSUE RAISED IN THE
PAST RELATED TO SHEDS OVER SOVIET SUBMARINE CONSTRUC-
TION YARDS.

4. WHILE ON-SITE INSPECTION HAS BEEN A CONTINUING

ISSUE IN MOVES TO STOP ATOMIC TESTS OR BAN THE

PRODUCTION OF CHEMICAL WEAPONS, IT HAS NOT FIGURED UNTIL
NOW IN ATTEMPTS TO LIMIT STRATEGIC WEAPONS.

5. SO LONG AS BOTH SIDES WERE DEALING WITH NUMBERS OF
STRATEGIC WEAPONS, AGREEMENTS COULD BE VERIFIED BY
RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES. AS NEGOTIATIONS MOVE INTO
DETAILED AREAS, SUCH AS LIMITS ON SPECIFIC TYPES OF
WEAPONS, VERIFICATION BY SATELLITE BECOMES DIFFICULT.
AS A RESULT, MR. WARNKE SAID, INSPECTORS WILL HAVE TO
VISIT MILITARY INSTALLATIONS TO SUPPLEMENT SATELLITE
MONITORING.

6. MR. WARNKE LEAVES TOMORROW TO RESUME FORMAL ARMS
NEGOTIATIONS IN GENEVA. THE TALKS HAVE BEEN SUS-
PENDED SINCE THE AMERICAN ELECTIONS LAST NOVEMBER.

7. THE NEGOTIATIONS, WHICH WILL FOCUS ON VERIFICATION,
CONCEALMENT AND NONTRANSFER OF WEAPONS, WILL BE PRE-
LIMINARY TO TALKS BETWEEN SECRETARY OF STATE CYRUS R.
VANCE AND FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREI A. GROMYKO IN GENEVA
NEXT WEEK.

8. MR. WARNKE WAS NOT OPTIMISTIC THAT MUCH PROGRESS
COULD BE MADE IN THE BRIEF VANCE-GROMYKO TALKS. "IN
A COUPLE DAYS OF TALKS," HE SAID, "ABOUT ALL YOU CAN DO
IS SET SOME NEGOTIATING FRAMEWORK FOR FUTURE DISCUS-
SIONS."

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9. AS A MATTER OF TACTICS, MR. WARNKE SAID, THE UNITED
STATES IS ADHERING TO ITS PROPOSALS, REJECTED IN MARCH,
AND IS WAITING FOR A SOVIET COUNTEROFFER.

10. A COMPREHENSIVE PROPOSAL, PREFERRED BY THE UNITED
STATES, CALLS FOR REDUCTIONS IN THE NUMBERS OF STRATE-
GIC BOMBERS AND MISSILES TO BETWEEN 1,800 AND 2,000.
AN ALTERNATIVE PLAN WOULD ACCEPT A 2,400 FORCE LEVEL
AGREED TO IN 1974 IN VLADIVOSTOK, WHILE LEAVING ASIDE
THE ISSUE WHETHER THE AMERICAN CRUISE MISSILE AND A
SOVIET BOMBER KNOWN IN THE WEST AS BACKFIRE SHOULD BE
COUNTED.

11. AS A CONSEQUENCE OF STATEMENTS BY SOVIET REPRE-
SENTATIVES, MR. WARNKE SAW POSSIBILITY OF A COMPROMISE,
WITH THE RUSSIANS ACCEPTING SOME CUTS IN THE 2,400
LEVEL. IN RETROSPECT, HE SAID, THE TALKS HELD IN
MOSCOW IN MARCH MAY HAVE FAILED BECAUSE THE UNITED

STATES UNDERESTIMATED THE IMPORTANCE THE RUSSIANS
ATTACHED TO THE VLADIVOSTOK ACCORD, REACHED BY LEONID

I. BREZHNEV AND PRESIDENT GERALD R. FORD.

12. THE PREVIOUSLY UNDISCLOSED AMERICAN REQUIREMENT FOR
SOME FORM OF ON-SITE INSPECTION COULD INTRODUCE A NEW
COMPLICATION. MR. WARNKE SAID THE REQUIREMENT HAD BEEN
CONVEYED TO AMBASSADOR ANATOLY F. DOBRYNIN IN RECENT
WEEKS.

13. STARTING WITH THE NUCLEAR TEST BAN NEGOTIATIONS IN
THE LATE 1950'S, THE SOVIET UNION HAS OPPOSED ON-SITE
MONITORING AS UNNECESSARY AND AS A SUBTERFUGE FOR SPY-
ING. LAST NOVEMBER, IT SEEMED TO RELAX ITS OPPOSITION
BY RAISING THE POSSIBILITY OF ON-SITE INSPECTIONS TO
MONITOR A BAN ON UNDERGROUND TESTING.
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14. MR. WARNKE SAID IT MIGHT BE POSSIBLE TO WORK OUT A
CHALLENGE FORM OF INSPECTION, IN WHICH ONE SIDE, SUS-
PICIOUS OF A WEAPONS DEVELOPMENT ON THE OTHER SIDE,
COULD DEMAND ON-SITE INSPECTION. IF PERMISSION WERE
REFUSED, HE SAID, IT WOULD RAISE SUSPICIONS THAT THE
CHALLENGED NATION WAS CHEATING, WITH RESULTANT PRES-
SURES ON THAT NATION TO AGREE TO INSPECTION IF IT
WANTED TO PRESERVE THE AGREEMENT.

15. MR. WARNKE SAW ON-SITE INSPECTION AS A SUPPLEMENT
TO, RATHER THAN A SUBSTITUTE FOR, THE PRESENT METHODS,
WHICH RELY ON RECONNAISSANCE SATELLITES. HE SAID ON-
SITE INSPECTION MIGHT BE REQUIRED TO MONITOR A PRO-
POSED MORATORIUM ON MODERNIZATION AT LAND-BASED STRA-
TEGIC MISSILES AND POSSIBLY THE PROPOSED RESTRICTIONS
ON RANGE AND DEPLOYMENT OF CRUISE MISSILES. (SIC)

16. IN RESPONSE TO A QUESTION, MR. WARNKE DESCRIBED
THE MARK 12A WARHEAD, A HIGHLY ACCURATE, POWERFUL
WARHEAD THAT IS TO BE DEPLOYED ON MINUTEMAN MISSILES
IN THE COMING YEAR, AS A POTENTIALLY DESTABILIZING
FACTOR. IT IS DESIGNED TO ATTACK MILITARY INSTALLA-
TIONS AND MISSILE SILOS AND COULD BE VIEWED BY THE
SOVIET UNION AS AN ATTEMPT TO ACQUIRE A FIRST-STRIKE
CAPABILITY.

17. MR. WARNKE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT AGREEMENT COULD BE
REACHED ON A NEW ARMS TREATY BEFORE THE WARHEAD WAS
DEPLOYED. WHILE HE DID NOT ELABORATE, PRESUMABLY HE
VIEWED A BAN ON MISSILE MODERNIZATION AS PREVENTING

DEPLOYMENT OF THE NEW WARHEAD, A MEASURE THAT IN ITSELF
PROBABLY WOULD REQUIRE ON-SITE MONITORING.

18. HE ACKNOWLEDGED THAT A LIMITATION ON MISSILE-TEST
FIRINGS PROPOSED BY THE UNITED STATES IN ITS COMPRE-
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HENSIVE PROPOSAL PROBABLY WOULD RETARD DEVELOPMENT OF
THE TRIDENT SUBMARINE MISSILE. SUCH A SLOWDOWN IN A
WEAPONS PROGRAM UNDOUBTEDLY WOULD UPSET THE PENTAGON,
BUT MR. WARNKE DESCRIBED IT AS PART OF THE PRICE TO BE
PAID FOR LIMITING STRATEGIC WEAPONS. END TEXT. CHRISTOPHER

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